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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD ALLEN BRADSHAW, 
Defendant-Appellant., 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant, Richard Allen Bradshaw, was charged 
with interfering with a police officer. Said defendant 
pled not guilty. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Richard Allen Bradshaw was charged with a viola-
tion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1953), as amended, 
interfering with an arrest made by a law enforcement 
officer. He was convicted on that charge in the justice's 
Case No. 
14060 
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court, Milford precinct, and subsequently by a jury in 
the District Court in Beaver County, J. Harlan Burns, 
presiding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the jury verdict 
of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The violation arose from the following facts: 
On the evening of March 15, 1974, Officer Cox, while 
on duty and dressed in full police uniform (T. 5), ob^ 
served Richard Allen Bradshaw driving a vehicle down 
the main street of town (T. 7). Officer Cox had been 
advised by radio that Mr. Bradshaw's license had been 
suspended and therefore proceeded to follow him. Mr. 
Bradshaw ignored the flashing red light of the police 
car and did not pull over (T. 7). Officer Cox followed 
Mr. Bradshaw to a service station, got out of the patrol 
car and told Mr. Bradshaw that he would have to write 
him a citation for driving with a suspended license (41-
2-28) (T. 7). As Office Cox was writing up the citation, 
Mr. Bradshaw paid for bis gas, got in his car and drove 
away from the station (T. 7). Officer Cox put on his 
siren (T. 9) and followed Bradshaw three blocks to a 
motel where he was staying at that time. Both men 
got out of their vehicles and Officer Cox told appellant 
that he was unde- arrest for resisting arrest (T. 10). 
Mr. Bradshaw approached Officer Cox with an unidenti-
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fiable object in his hand and pushed him on the chest 
(T. 10). As a precautionary measure, Officer Cox drew 
his revolver. In response, the appellant turned his back 
and walked away from the scene. 
A warrant was later issued by the justice of the peace 
for the arrest of Mr. Bradshaw under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-305 (1953), as amended: 
"A person is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor when he intentionally interferes with 
a person recognized to be a law enforcement 
officer seeking to effect an arrest or detention 
of himself or another regardless of whether there 
is a legal basis for the arrest." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IS FINAL AS TO ALL MATTERS EXCEPT 
THOSE WHICH RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-14 (1953), provides: 
"Appeals — Any person dissatisfied with 
a judgment rendered in a justice's court, whether 
the same was rendered on default or after trial, 
may apply for a new trial or appeal therefrom 
to the district court of the county within the 
time and in the manner provided by law." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-5 (1953), provides as follows 
in pertinent part: 
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"Appeals shall lie from the final judgments of 
justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases 
to the district courts, on both questions of law 
and fact with such limitations and restrictions 
as are or may be provided by law; and the de-
cisions of the district counts on such appeals 
shall be final, except in cases involving the val-
idity or constitutionality of a statute.'9 (Em-
phasis added.) 
Pursuant to the above statutes appellant filed an 
appeal from the district court challenging the oonstition-
ality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1953), as amended. 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a single 
issue — the constitutionality of the statute. In State v. 
Holtgreve, 200 Pac. 894 (1921), the Supreme Court of 
Utah explained the extent of this judicial review: 
"In view that the case originated in the 
justice's court and was appealed to the district 
court, whose decisions, except on the validity 
of statutes upon which the conviction is based, 
are final, this court, under the provisions of our 
constitution, may not review errors except those 
which relate to or assail the validity of the act 
under which appellant was convicted." 
Any other issues that appellant raises are done so im-
properly, and should not be reviewed by this Court. 
POINT II. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (1953), AS 
AMENDED, DOES NOT DEPRIVE APPEL-
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LANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE 
SEIZURE OF HIS PERSON, AND HIS CON-
VICTION THEREUNDER SHOULD THERE-
FORE BE UPHELD. 
Appellant contends that Section 76-8-305 is uncon-
stitutional and that his conviction far violation of the 
statute cannot therefore be upheld. 
Section 76-8-305 was enacted by the Utah legislature 
in 1973 and provides as follows: 
"A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
when he intentionally interferes with a person 
recognized to be a law enforcement officer seek-
ing to effect an arrest or detention of himself 
or another regardless of whether there is a legal 
basis for the aarest." 
This Court has previously held that: 
"Statutes duly enacted by the legislature 
are presumed to be constitutional and valid." 
Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 175, 
97 P. 2d 937 at 939 (1940). 
This principle is one from which there is no dissent 
in any jurisdiction and the presumption stands in the 
absence of compelling reasons to the contrary. Moruzzi 
v. Federal Life and Casualty Co., 45 N. M. 35, 75 P. 2d 
320 at 326 (1938). 
Appellant bases his constitutional challenge on the 
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Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and on Article 1, § 14 of the Utah Constitution, which 
states: 
"The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated. And no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation 
particularly describing the place to be searched 
and the person or thing to be seized." 
Appellant claims that his guaranteed right against 
unreasonable seizure is violated by Section 76-8-305 since 
it makes unlawful any interference regardless of whether 
there is a legal basis for the arrest or detention. 
This statute does not take away any of appellant's 
rights. It does not make lawful an unreasonable intru-
sion. His rights remain intact. The statute's only effect 
is to eliminate the remedy of self-help. Its purpose is 
to promote a peaceful and orderly administration of 
justice. The suspect's remedy if he thinks he has been 
unlawfully arrested or detained is in the courts, not the 
streets. 
"A new principle of right conduct has been 
espoused. It is argued that if a peace officer is 
making an illegal arrest but is not using force, 
the remedy of the citizen should be that of 
suing the officer for false arrest, not resistance 
with force. The legality of a peaceful arrest 
may frequently be a close question. It is a ques-
tion more properly determined by courts than 
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by participants in what may be a highly emo-
tional situation . . . It is not too much to ask 
that one believing himself unlawfuilly arrested 
should submit to the officer and thereafter seek 
his legal remedies in court." Miller v. Alaska, 
462 P. 2d 421 at 426 (Alaska, 1969). (Emphasis 
added.) 
Of course, requirement of peaceful submission to 
arrest or detention, lawful or unlawful, has no applica-
tion to the right to resist excessive force. People v. Cur-
tis, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 450 P. 2d 233 (1969). If life or 
limb is threatened, coimiter-active force is justifiable, 
However, where only a threat to liberty is posed (as 
was the situation in the present case), resistance is not 
expedient. Resolution lies within the system. Gray v. 
State, 463 P. 2d 897 at 908 (Alaska, 1970). 
A similar statute enacted in California in 1957 (taken 
almost verbatim from the Uniform Arrest Act) was con-
strued to apply to resistance of unlawful as well as lawful 
arrests, and was upheld. People v. Curtis, supra at 236. 
That court considered the background of the common 
law right to resistance of an unlawful arrest and found 
that it is no longer a necessary safeguard against un-
reasonable seizure. Elimination of that right is not a 
deprivation of liberty. 
"We conclude the state in removing the 
right to resist does not contribute to or effectu-
ate this deprivation of liberty . . . Thus self-help 
as a practical remedy is anachronistic, whatever 
may have been its original justification or effi-
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cacy in an era when common law doctrine per-
mitting resistance evolved . . . Accordingly, the 
state, in deleting the right to resist, has not 
actually altered or diminished the remedies 
available against the illegality of an arrest with-
out probable cause; it has merely required a 
person to submit peiacefully to the inevitable 
and to pursue his available remedies through 
the orderly judicial process . . . There is no con-
stitutional impediment to the state's policy of 
removing controversies over the legality of 
arrest from the streets to the courtroom." Peo-
ple v. Curtis, 74 Gal. Rptr. 713, 450 P. 2d 233, 
236-237 (1969). 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT'S INTERFERENCE WITH A 
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL SEEK-
ING TO AFFECT AN ARREST OR DETEN-
TION WAS A VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-8-305 (1953), AS AMENDED, 
WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST WAS 
LAWFUL. 
Utah Code Arm. § 76-8-305 (1953), as amended, 
provides: 
"A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
when he intentionally interferes with a person 
recognized to be a law enforcement official seek-
ing to affect an arrest or detention of himself or 
another regardless of whether there is a legal 
brsis for the arrest." 
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Three criteria must be met for a violation of the above 
statute: 
1. The accused must intentionally interfere with 
an officer's action. 
2. The accused must recognize the person to be a 
law enforcement officer. 
3. The officer must be seeking to arrest or detain 
the accused or another person. 
In the instant case, all three requirements were 
present. 
1. Officer Cox attempted to stop the appellant in his 
vehicle, for suspected violation of the traffic laws. First, 
he pursued Mr. Bradshaw in his patrol car with red 
light flashing. Next, he attempted to write out a cita-
tion. Finally, he was forced to again pursue the appel-
lant, with siren blaring. 
2. Mr. Bradshaw did recognize or should have rec-
ognized that Officer Cox was a law enforcement official. 
He was dressed in full uniform and was driving a patrol 
car well marked with the official city police emblem and 
familiar red light on top. Mr. Bradshaw knew Officer 
Cox personally and should have recognized him in his 
professional capacity. 
3. Recognizing that an officer of the law was seek-
ing to arrest, or at least detain him, Mr. Bradshaw in-
tentionally interfered with such action. He took no heed 
of the patrol car pursuing him. He did not pull over or 
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make any attempt to do so. When Officer Cox was in 
the process of writing a citation Mr. Bradshaw drove 
away from the Officer in his own vehicle. When Officer 
Cox followed him again, this time with his siren blaring, 
Mr. Bradshaw continued to ignore the law and again 
failed to pull over to the side of the road. After Officer 
Cox followed Mr. Bradshaw to his residence, and in-
formed him that he was under anrest, Mr. Bradshaw 
approached Officer Cox, placed his hand on the officer's 
chest, and shoved him backwards. He then turned his 
back and walked away from the officer. 
Appellant claims that the attempted detention and 
arrest were unlawful and that his interference was there-
fore permissible. The statute clearly provides contra. 
"A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
. . . regardless of whether there is a legal basis 
for the arrest." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 
(1953), as amended. (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant also claims that an officer has no duty 
to make an unlawful arrest. This is true. People v. 
Curtis, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 450 P. 2d 233 (1969). But 
under Section 76-8-305, "duty" is not an issue. Former 
statutes, repealed by the 1973 legislature concerned con-
duct of an officer engaged in his official duties,, See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-54 (1953), as amended; Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (1953), as amended. The cases 
of Lopez and Hurley, quoted by appellant on the issue 
of duty, pertain to those statutes and are not applicable 
in the instant case. 
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POINT IV. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT A FINDING OF PROBABLE 
CAUSE BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Appellant contends that the state did not meat its 
burden of showing probable cause for arrest and that 
the trial court therefore erred in not taking the case 
from the jury. 
A violation of Section 76-8-305 does not require the 
showing of probable cause. It is applicable to any in-
terference '"regardless of whether there is a legal basis 
for the arrest." Section 76-8-305. Probable cause is only 
significant where the validity of the arrest is in question. 
Even if this was the controlling issue, probable cause is 
determined by standards of reasonableness and "it is 
primarily the responsibility of the trial court to deter-
mine the quesition of reasonableness and to rule upon 
admissibility of evidence; his rulings are indulged with 
a presumption of correctness and they should not be 
disturbed unless it clearly appears that he was in error." 
State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d 269, 508 P. 2d 534 at 536 
(1973). 
The facts of the case support a finding by the trial 
court of probable cause and do not as appellant contends, 
present a case of clear error on the part of that court. 
Appelknt contends that his attempted arrest or de-
tention by Officer Cox was a "seizure" within the decKni-
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tion of the fourth amendment. But, this being true, does 
not make it per se unconstitutional. The fourth amend-
ment forbids only unreasonable seizures. "The test to 
be applied on the question as to whether there has been 
a violation of the constitutional rights referred to above, 
is one of reasonableness," Torres, supra. 
Some Courts hold that an officer's mere stopping 
of a moving vehicle constitutes an arrest. Robertson v. 
State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S. W. 633 (1947). Others re-
gard this as an accosting or detention. State v. Williams, 
237 S. Ot. 252, 116 S. E. 2d 858 (1960). Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-13-1 (1953), defines arrest as: 
". . . the taking of a person into custody 
in a case and in a manner authorized by law. 
. . ." (Emphasis added.) 
State v. Beckendorf, 79 Utah 360, 10 P. 2d 1073 (1932), 
listed the basic elements of an airrest. These expressly 
included notice of legal custody. Pulling a vehicle over 
to the sid3 of the road, without more, is not "the taking 
of a person into custody" as in an arrest situation. It 
is a mere stopping or detention for investigatory pur-
poses. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), 
the Supreme Court announced the standard for determin-
ing the reasonableness of a detention or stop: 
" . . . a police officer may in appropriate cir-
cumstances and in an appropriate manner, ap-
proach a person for purposes of investigating 
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possible criminal behaviour, even though there 
is no probable cause for arrest." 
Numerous court decisions have held that police stops 
need not be founded on probable cause. In State v. 
Coleman, 254 Or. 1, 465 P. 2d 67 (1969), the Oregon 
Supreme Court held that an officer's stopping of an auto-
mobile to determine the identity of the occupant and the 
vehicle was not an arrest, and could be made without 
probable cause. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit has consistently held that probable cause is not 
required to stop automobiles. United States v. Sadler, 
458 F. 2d 906 (10th Cir. 1972). In Adams v. Williams, 
407 U. S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921 (1972), the Supreme Court 
said: 
"A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in 
order to determine his identity or to momen-
tarily maintain the status quo while obtaining 
more information, may be most reasonable in 
light of the facts known to the officer at the 
tame." 
If it is considered that pulling a vehicle over to the side 
of the road is not an arrest, but rather a detention, then 
no standard of probable cause is required. Hence, the 
state cannot have failed in its burden to prove such. If 
the stopping of the vehicle is viewed as an arrest, a dif-
ferent standard is applicable. 
The standard for arrest is probable cause defined 
in terms of "facts and circumstances within [the arresting 
officer's] knowledge and of which he had reasonably 
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trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a 
prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had com-
mitted or was rc>mmijtting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 
379 U. S. 89 at 91, 85 S. Ct. 223 (1964). 
Officer Cox was advised over his radio that Mr. Bnad-
shaw's license had been suspended and under Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-2-28 (1953), operating a vehicle under such 
circumstances is unlawful. Seeing the defendant driving 
down the main street of town, Officer Cox therefore fol-
lowed him. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-3(1) (1953), as amended, 
provides that a peace officer may make an arrest with-
out a warrant for a public offense committed in his pres-
ence. Officer Cox had reason to believe that such was 
the case; that a public offense, i.e„ a violation of the 
traffic laws, was being committed in his presence. He 
therefore followed Mr. Bradshaw in the prescribed offi-
cial manner (with red light flashing) in an attempt 
to make a stop. 
Officer Cox subsequently discovered that Mr. Brad-
shaw's license had not actually been suspended. But 
this fact does not obviate the basis for the stop in the 
first place. Probable cause to arrest means less than 
evidence which would justify conviction. 
"While the requirement is not satisfied 
merely by a showing of good faith, neither does 
it go to the other extreme and require that be 
be sure of evidence that will establish guilt." 
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State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P. 2d 772 
at 775 (1969). 
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as 
the very name implies, we deal with probabili-
ties. These are not technical; they are the fac-
tual and practical considerations of everyday 
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not 
legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U. S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302 (1949). 
Officer Cox proceeded on information he reasonably 
believed to be accurate. As it turns out, he was mis-
taken, but his acts were in "good faith" and "within 
standards of decent and decorous behavior." Torres at 
336. 
"Because many situations which confront 
officers are more or lees ambiguous, room must 
be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But 
the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, 
acting on facts lending sensibly to their conclu-
sions of probability." Brinegar at 1311. 
If probable cause to arrest required proof positive 
or some such stricter standard, the hands of the police 
would be tied. There authority to question and investi-
gate would be effectively destroyed. Recognizing that 
the interests of the individual to be free from unwar-
ranted intrusion by the government and the interests of 
the police in fulfilling their function in an ordered so-
ciety, the legislators and the courts have reached a com-
promise. 
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"The essential thing is to keep within the 
reasonable middle ground, between protecting 
of the law abiding citizenry from high-handed 
or officious intrustions into their private af-
fairs and the imposing of undue restrictions 
upon conscientious officers doing their duty in 
the investigation of crime." State v. Criscola, 
21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P. 2d 517 at 519 (1968). 
The standard set, by which to judge the actions of 
the government, is reasonableness: 
"Under this practical compromise, a police-
man's on the scene assessment of probable cause 
prTddes legal justification for arresting a person 
suspected of crime, and for a brief period of de-
tention to take the administrative steps incident 
to arrest." Gerstein v. Pugh, 95 S. Ct. 854 at 
862-3 (1975). 
Officer Cox's assessment of the situation should not 
be lightly disregarded. He acted on facts and informa-
tion which he believed to be true, and which justified 
his belief in appellant's guilt. He acted in good faith, 
not arbitrarily, or without justification. On these facts 
the trial court had sufficient basis for its findings and 
its determination should not be overturned. Officer Cox 
had probable cause and the attempted arrest of Richard 
Bradshaw was lawful. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's interference with a law enforcement offi-
cial's action was a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
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305 (1953), as ameoded, and his conviction thereunder 
should be upheld as the statute does not deprive him 
of any constitutional rights. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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